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TWle investigate a sequential voting model in which voters'forecasts of outcomes on future issues are determined endogenously. Voters are assumed to make decisions in an environment in which future outcomes are uncertain. The uncertainty arises from two possible sources. Voters may be uncertain of other voters' preferences. In addition, events that occur before future issues are decided may affect voters' preferences on future votes. Information available to voters at each point in time is characterized. An equilibrium to the voting problem, if one exists, is one for which the outcome on the issue currently being decided and voters'forecasts of outcomes on future issues are determined simultaneously. We show that an equilibrium exists under a particular voting institution and characterize voters' forecasts for this equilibrium.
S everal recent studies
have investigated the properties of majority rule voting processes when issues are voted on sequentially. The motivation for this approach is twofold: (1) to investigate the role of institutional structure in influencing outcomes and (2) to determine whether problems of nonexistence of equilibrium in multidimensional voting problems may be overcome by assuming a particular structure for voting decisions (see Denzau and Mackay 1981; Feld and Grofman 1987; Kramer 1977; Plott 1967) . Denzau and Mackay (1981) show that existence of equilibrium and the properties of equilibrium when it exists depend not only on voters' preferences but also on their expectations about outcomes of future votes. In particular, they show that an equilibrium may fail to exist if voters have perfect foresight expectations. Moreover, when preferences are such that an equilibrium exists with perfect foresight expectations, the equilibrium will generally differ from the one that would prevail under myopic expectations. Their analysis and subsequent analyses (including the present one) assume voters have weighted Euclidean distance (Enelow and Hinich 1984) preference functions.
Enelow and Hinich (1983) study an environment in which voters forecast outcomes on future votes with error. They show that voter preferences on each issue are single-peaked if each voter's forecast of outcomes on future votes does not depend on the outcome currently under consideration. Enelow (1984) In this example, the uncertainty about future outcomes arises because voters do not know the preferences of other voters. However, from knowledge of the distribution of preferences in the population, they will be able to form a forecast of outcomes on future votes, as we show below.
In many settings, the outcomes on future votes will be uncertain not only because voters are not entirely sure of other voters' preferences but also because events that may occur before the future votes are decided may affect preferences over future outcomes. A heightened or diminished level of conflict elsewhere in the world may affect willingness to spend for defense. New information about trade deficits or surpluses may affect preferences for protectionist legislation. The emergence of a recession may affect willingness to fund unemployment compensation programs. Disruptions in the supply of oil from abroad may affect willingness to spend resources to develop technologies for alternative energy sources. The next example illustrates how uncertainty about future events might be captured in the structure presented. This voting procedure clearly does not capture the richness of information transmission and agenda formation in committee decision making (Austen-Smith 1988). However, this approach permits us to sidestep some of the complexity of models of agenda formation. The procedure proves to be a useful vehicle for gaining insights into models such as the sequential-voting model we study.
In this model, a player i's strategy maps the history of the game (the outcomes on past votes) and player i's type (the vector cs) into a vote on the current issue. We consider the Nash equilibrium that emerges by solving the model using backward induction. It is a property of our model that a voter's optimal decision at each stage of the game is the same regardless of the voter's beliefs about other voters' types (i.e., the It's of other voters) at that stage of the game. Hence, we do not need to make any particular assumption about how a voter updates beliefs about other voters' types as the game proceeds. It is natural to assume, however, that beliefs are updated using Bayes's rule, in which case, our solution to the game is a sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson 1982) .
We next present some definitions and 
In this example, the outcome on the first issue to be voted on (issue 1) is simply the median of the most-preferred values on that issue (equation 13). By contrast, the outcome on the second issue to be voted on (issue 2) depends on the outcome on the first issue (equation 11). Thus, the order of voting will often matter. It follows that the sequential voting outcomes need not be the same as outcomes obtained if the issue space were rotated so that voters' salience weights in the rotated space were diagonal. In the rotated space voting outcomes would be invariant to order while in the original space outcomes will often depend on order.
We now generalize to the case of an arbitrary number of issues. We will make use of the following linear algebra result. For simplicity, we present our proof for the case in which there is no common shock, w. When the proof is complete, we indicate how the result can be generalized to include the common shock. We next present several definitions used in proving our major result. The proof can be extended to the case where there is a common shock, a, in the following way. Replace xi in the theorem with x(?,, w). Interpret the expectation operator at each step of the proof as the expectation conditional on elements of the vector X = (co1, W2, . . . , wT) that have been revealed to date. The steps of the theorem can simply be repeated with these changes.
The discussion indicates why the proof remains valid when a common shock is introduced. However, the introduction of a common shock raises an interesting issue. All voters know that common shocks will occur before the sequence of votes. They know that the realizations of those shocks will affect their preferences over voting choices. One strategy that voters might adopt is to propose policies that are contingent on the realizations of the common shocks. There are many programs that have such contingencies. Social security benefits are indexed for inflation, expenditures for unemployment compensation are contingent on the number of people who are unemployed, disaster relief expenditures are contingent on the occurrence of disasters, and so on. An interesting problem for future research is to investigate the possibility of introducing contingent policies as objects of voting in a sequential voting framework.
In the model we have considered thus far (with or without the common shock to preferences), voters have differing forecasts of future outcomes because they have private information about their own preferences that may not be available to others. If voters have private information about the distribution of other voters' preferences based on private opinion polls, eavesdropping in legislative cloakrooms, and so on, this would provide a further reason for heterogeneity of voter forecasts. However, the results of the theorem would still hold. In the proof, expectations for each voter are taken to be conditional on the information held by that voter. If voters have private information about other voters' forecasts, the coefficients on past outcomes in voters' forecasting rules would still be common across voters, while the distribution of voter forecasts would continue to differ across voters.
In deriving our results, we have assumed that voters have imperfect knowledge of voters' preferences but that they know the distribution f(.), from which ideal points are drawn. Models in which agents' subjective beliefs about relevant probability distributions are assumed to conform to the objective distributions were first introduced by Muth (1961) . He proposed calling expectations formed using this assumption "rational expectations." McKelvey and Ordeshook's (1985a Ordeshook's ( , 1985b investigations of formation of voter expectations also uses the rational expectations approach.
The rational expectations approach implies that an outside observer who wants to study the behavior of voters can use the actual distributions of relevant random variables to predict voters' forecasts. In this way, a link is provided from the theory to actual voter forecasts. This is not the only way that such a link can be made. However, as we argued in the introduction, it is essential that some link be made if the model is to generate implications regarding voter forecasts that may potentially be tested. The rational expectations approach has proven to be a fruitful approach to generating testable implications in other contexts (Lucas and Sargent 1981).
For an equilibrium to exist, however, it is not necessary to invoke the assumption of rational expectations. The proof is valid as long as voters know that the salience matrix (A in our model) in other voters' preference functions is the same as their own. It is not necessary that voters' subjective assessments of the distribution of ideal points be the objective distribution, voters may make systematic errors in predicting outcomes on future votes. However, it is still the case in our model that it is a dominant strategy for each voter to vote his or her ideal point on each issue. Thus, in the case where there is no common shock to preferences, systematic errors in voter forecasts will not affect the sequence of outcomes. If there are common shocks to preferences and voters' subjective assessments of the distribution of the common shock differ from the actual distribution, an equilibrium will exist; but the sequence of outcomes will, in general, be different from the sequence that emerges when the distribution of shocks is common knowledge.
An important assumption that we have made is that the salience matrix, A, in Our model has the property that voters have a dominant strategy on each vote, and our analysis relies heavily on this property. It would be interesting to investigate different voting games, in particular when dominant strategies are not present.
Conclusion
Building on the work of Denzau and MacKay (1981), Enelow and Hinich (1983) , and Enelow (1984), we have presented a strategy for deriving endogenous voter forecasts when sequential voting occurs under conditions of uncertainty. Our approach assumes that voters use all available information in making their forecasts. In addition, we assume that voters know the distribution from which preference parameters are drawn. Voters then deduce the distribution of outcomes from their knowledge of this distribution and their knowledge of how decisions are made. Hence, if the voting sequence were repeated with a new draw from the distribution of voters for each sequence, the ex post distribution of outcomes would-be the distribution voters use in making their forecasts. It is in this sense that voters in our models do not make systematic errors.
It is natural to be somewhat skeptical about voters' ability to gather and process the information required to behave in the fashion assumed in our derivation of endogenous forecasts. Indeed, this issue arises in most rational expectations models. One response to this criticism has been the argument that voters behave "as if" they are following the strategy that we characterize in our analysis, whether they perform detailed computations or not. Attention has recently been devoted to the question of assessing whether individuals using simple forecasting strategies may "learn" the forecasting rules that emerge in the rational expectations formulation (Marcet and Sargent 1989) . This is one avenue for addressing the concern that an analysis such as ours presumes too much of voters. An alternative strategy is to attempt to characterize how the information that voters have or use falls short of that assumed in our analysis. As we indicated, an equilibrium will exist in our model in cases where voters' beliefs about the relevant probability distributions do not conform to the actual distributions; but their forecasts will be systematically in error and the sequence of outcomes may differ from that in the case where the actual distribution are known. Thus, departing from the rational expectations assumption does not pose a challenge for proving existence of equilibrium but rather for deriving potentially testable propositions from the theory.
